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How does a religiously affiliated law school or university maintain
both its academic and religious commitments over the long term? To
crystallize that question, how has Notre Dame done it? How does Notre
Dame expect to keep doing it?
In his luncheon speech yesterday, Notre Dame's Provost stated three
commitments at Notre Dame:
One, Notre Dame is committed to academic excellence. In every
recruitment, it wants to hire the best faculty member it can find.
Two, Notre Dame is committed to faculty governance. The
faculty hired pursuant to the first commitment will run the institu-
tion, and hire their successors, largely on the basis of votes cast
within departments that are defined by academic discipline. No-
tre Dame allocates authority this way because faculty are gener-
ally better than boards of trustees at running universities.
Three, Notre Dame is committed to perpetuating its religious
mission.1
How do they expect to maintain all three of these commitments?
How do you turn an institution over to voters who have been selected on
the ground of excellence in geology, law, or French literature, and expect
that in fifty years, or a hundred years, or two hundred years the religious
mission will not have fundamentally changed? That is the essential
problem for religious law schools and religious universities.
I. SoME TECHNIQUES THAT Do AND Do NOT LIMrr
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
I teach secular subjects in a secular law school; I cannot tell religious
law schools how to solve their central problem. But I suspect that the
conflict between academic commitment and religious commitment is like
many other pairs of conflicting commitments in academia. All law
schools struggle to sustain conflicting commitments. How do you sustain
* Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law and Associate Dean for Research, The
University of Texas School of Law.
1. Timothy O'Meara, The Idea of a Catholic University: A Personal Perspective, 78 MARQ.
L. REv. 389 (1995).
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a commitment to teaching in the face of the faculty's incentive to re-
search? How do you sustain a commitment to academic excellence more
generally in the face of the faculty's incentives to personal comfort and
convenience? We all face such conflicts; the religious schools simply
have one more pair of conflicting commitments that the rest of us do not
have.
With respect to most of these conflicting commitments, the most im-
portant thing we can do is to keep talking about them. We try to social-
ize new faculty to believe that teaching is important, and that to do all
aspects of the job well requires sacrifice of personal leisure. We remind
each other of our commitments to teaching and to excellence. No aca-
demic freedom issue raised is by such jawboning efforts to sustain com-
mitments that we think are important to our institutions. If presidents,
deans, provosts, and senior faculty believe it is critical that the teaching
mission, the religious mission, or any other inconvenient commitment be
sustained, and if they instill that commitment in junior faculty, then from
generation to generation the commitment can be sustained. But this
kind of socialization is hard to do, and not all schools will succeed.
A second thing a religious school might do to sustain its religious
commitment is preferences in hiring. Now here are the beginnings of an
academic freedom issue. Notre Dame tries to do the original version of
affirmative action.2 It tries to make sure there are many Catholics in the
pool, and then it hires the best academic. That is one approach. In
surveys, most religiously affiliated institutions report going further than
that. They report at least some religious preference in hiring.3
In discussions between religious institutions and accreditation au-
thorities, such hiring preferences have been understood principally to
raise a discrimination issue and not an academic freedom issue. But they
can easily be understood either way. Suppose you have two young appli-
cants for an assistant professor position, and you say they are both quite
good, that one is a little better, but the one that is a little better is an
agnostic. The second-best academically is a Catholic and more support-
ive of the religious mission, and you decide to hire him. The critics of
religious schools can treat that as a discrimination issue; you have dis-
criminated on the basis of religion. But they can also say that this is
2. Id.
3. EDWARD M. GAFFNEY, JR. & PHILIP R. MOoTS, GOVERNMENT AND CAMPus: FED-
ERAL REGULATION OF RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED HIGHER EDUCATION 34 (1982) (reporting
data from survey of 210 responding institutions).
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discrimination on the basis of what the rejected applicant thinks, so that
it is also an academic freedom issue.
There are limits to this reconceptualization. The best reasoned ac-
counts of academic freedom insist that academic freedom is not
equivalent to general freedom of speech or thought. Rather, the special
protections of academic freedom are justified by a professor's special
expertise in an academic discipline. On that view of academic freedom,
discriminating between Catholics and agnostics in the hiring of law
professors would generally not raise an academic freedom issue, because
their religious beliefs do not grow out of their disciplinary expertise.
There is an obvious irony here; the religious law school, which maintains
that religious belief is relevant, would appeal to a secular conception of
the role of academics, under which religious belief is irrelevant.
But the academic freedom issue cannot always be avoided so easily.
If you are hiring a theology professor, the candidate's religious beliefs
are relevant to what he or she teaches and writes in his or her academic
discipline. Ironically, just where the institution's need to prefer the
faithful is greatest, the academic freedom objection becomes strongest.
A more common example in law schools would be beliefs that go
both to some legal issue and some religious issue. Suppose you have two
young applicants for a position in constitutional law. They are both first
rate, and they are both Catholic. But one is strongly pro-choice and
thinks that Roe v. Wade4 defends a great human liberty, and one is
strongly pro-life and thinks that Roe was a usurpation. A preference for
the pro-life applicant squarely poses an academic freedom issue. Their
views on Roe are at the core of the professional judgment and compe-
tence of the two potential faculty members.
Even so, I suspect that some such preference in hiring is critical over
the long run. If you do not have a critical mass of faculty committed to
the religious mission, that mission will not be sustained. Fortunately, re-
jected applicants rarely sue; they have nothing invested in the institution
and usually find it simpler to take a different job elsewhere. I have not
done a careful search, but I know of only one lawsuit alleging either
discrimination or an academic freedom violation because a university
took substantive views into account in hiring. A would-be theology pro-
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see William R. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of
Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberties, 404 Aimqss AM. AcAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 141 (1977); David M. Rabhon, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institu-
tional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 LAW & CorNrnEMP. PROBS. 227,241-
44 (No. 3 Summer 1990).
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fessor unsuccessfully sued Marquette University, alleging that the
school's preference for Jesuits discriminated on the basis of sex, and that
its consideration of her views on abortion violated a common law right
to academic freedom.5 I know of no such claim against a secular institu-
tion, although secular faculties sometimes covertly consider the views of
applicants. In the example of the two constitutional law teachers, there
are surely schools where the pro-life applicant would not have much of a
chance, and where the pro-choice applicant would be preferred.
The core academic freedom issue is not hiring, but tenure and tenure
revocation. Can you discharge a faculty member for taking a position
contrary to the religious teachings of the sponsoring church? That is
core to academic freedom, but it is plainly the least important technique
for preserving the school's religious mission. It is least important be-
cause it happens so rarely; the cost is so enormous that many schools will
not do it at all, and the rest will do it only in the most extreme cases. If
you have one faculty member attacking the religious mission and saying
things that you just cannot live with, that one person is not going to
undermine the whole mission. If a critical mass of the faculty remains
committed to the religious mission, the religious mission will still be
there after this troublesome person is gone. On the other hand, if you
have a large group of people attacking the religious mission, the mission
is probably lost anyway, and you cannot fire them all.
So I think that discharge is not an issue about perpetuating the reli-
gious mission over the long term. Rather, discharge is an issue of integ-
rity in the present. Carl Monk said yesterday that the question for the
Association of American Law Schools (AALS) is whether there are
some values that are so important that we have to impose them on eve-
rybody.6 That is not a question that the state should be asking about
religious institutions. But I think it parallels the question that the reli-
gious institutions should ask themselves. Are there some issues that are
so important that we have to insist on at least acquiescence from
everybody?
I know of no such case that has arisen in a law school, but I can
imagine some that could arise in law schools. Sarah Weddington, the
prevailing counsel in Roe v. Wade, now teaches in the public affairs
school at my university. Suppose she were at Notre Dame. Litigating
Roe v. Wade from a Catholic law school might have provoked a dis-
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Carl Monk, Remarks Delivered at the Conference of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools,
78 MARQ. L. RFv. 377 (1995).
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charge; I assume that it would at least have provoked debate over a dis-
charge. Some of Dean Glickstein's remarks yesterday imply that there
are issues that might provoke consideration of discharge at Touro,
although I assume that he would view discharging a faculty member as a
harder choice than restricting a student organization or barring an
outside speaker; he addressed only these easier issues. 7 However we
think any particular case might come out, it is possible to imagine such
cases in a religiously affiliated law school.
II. OBSTACLES TO THE USE OF THESE TECHNIQUES
A. Fonnal Obstacles
There has been much discussion at this conference of accreditation
rules and of AALS rules as obstacles to preservation of the religious
mission. These rules are not the most important obstacles, but they may
be the most tangible. These rules attempt to limit some of the things
religious schools might do to sustain their religious commitment and pre-
serve their religious integrity.
These rules are the principal reason it matters whether we character-
ize hiring preferences as an academic freedom issue or a discrimination
issue. Federal discrimination law and most state discrimination laws al-
low religious institutions to prefer employees of their own faith.8 Reli-
ance on these exemptions is not risk free; some enforcement authorities
are hostile to these exceptions and construe them narrowly.9 A relig-
iously affiliated law school might have to persuade a court that it is in-
deed a religious institution, that its preference for faculty with particular
views on issues important to the faith is a preference for faculty of its
own faith, and that it has not waived the exemption by hiring some
faculty who are not of its own faith. The school should win on all these
issues, but each presents some litigation risk.
The accreditation authorities have their own anti-discrimination
rules, but they also recognize modest exceptions. A religious school can
prefer members of its own faith as long as it does not preclude admission
7. Howard Glickstein, A Jewish-Sponsored Law Schook Its Purposes and Challenges, 78
MARQ. L. REv. 481 (1995).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1988).
9. See, e.g., Speer v. Presbyterian Children's Home and Serv. Agency, 847 S.W.2d 227
(Tex. 1993). The state claimed that Christianity is not a religion for purposes for the exemp-
tion, so that a Presbyterian agency that hired only Presbyterians would be protected, but a
Presbyterian agency that hired only Christians would not be. Id. at 239 (Gonzalez, J., concur-
ring). The court avoided decision on this issue by holding the case moot. Id. at 228.
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on the basis of religion.' ° This circumlocution presumably means that
you can maintain a critical mass of students and faculty of your own
faith, but you cannot insist on a faculty or a student body that is entirely
of your own faith - you must admit and hire some nonbelievers or be-
lievers in other faiths. This exception, if reasonably interpreted, protects
most religiously affiliated schools, but not those schools that want uni-
versal adherence to the sponsoring faith.
The important point is that these exceptions apply only to discrimina-
tion claims. It is not clear that the accreditation authorities recognize
any exception to their academic freedom rules. The dispute turns princi-
pally on the great muddle that the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) has now made of its academic freedom rules. The
American Bar Association and the Association of American Law
Schools rules seem to incorporate the AAUP rules." But the AAUP
rules are a mess.
The fundamental statement of the AAUP rules has an express excep-
tion for religious schools. This is the 1940 Statement of the AAUP and
the Association of American Colleges, which says that schools can have
limitations on academic freedom in pursuit of their religious mission if
they disclose those limitations in advance.' 2 But a 1970 committee re-
port claims that few religious schools want the exception, and that the
Committee no longer approves of the exception.'" Does that mean they
repealed it, or that they kept it but they are unhappy about it? Nobody
knows. And if they attempted to repeal the exception, how can the 1940
Statement, adopted by the entire body of two organizations, be amended
10. See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO TE BAR, AMERICAN BAR
Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS § 211(d) (1993) [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS]. A similar formulation appears in ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS EXEC. COMM.
REG. § 6.17(5) (permitting preference but "neither a blanket exclusion nor a limitation on the
number of persons" that do not share the school's religious commitment.).
11. See ABA STANDARDS §§ 103, 211, 405(d), and Annex I (tracking the AAUP's 1940
Statement); Bylaws of the Ass'n of Am. Law Schools § 6-8(d) and Exec. Com. Reg. § 6.16 in
AALS HANDBOOK (AALS 1993). See generally Michael W. McConnell, Academic Freedom
in Religious Institutions, in Symposium, Freedom and Tenure in the Academy: The Fiftieth An-
niversary of the 1940 Statement of Principles, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303 (Summer 1990).
12. AMERICAN Ass'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS & ASSOCIATION OF AM. COLLEGES, 1940
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, reprinted in AMERICAN
ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3 (1984), and in Symposium
on Freedom and Tenure in the Academy: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the 1940 Statement of
Principles, 53 LAW & CON'EMP. PROBS. app. at 407 (Summer 1990).
13. AMERICAN ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1970 IN ERPRTIVE COMMENTS, in POLICY,
DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 6 (AAUP, 1984).
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by a mere committee of one of the organizations? No one knows the
answer to that either.
A 1988 committee report says that religious institutions are fully sub-
ject to all the requirements of the 1940 statement even if they invoke the
exception.' 4 The chair of the 1988 committee later said that he thought
that meant the exception was repealed. However, he reported that the
majority of his committee surprised him after the vote with the claim
that their report meant only that religious schools must adhere to the
1940 Statement including the exception.' 5
Whatever that leaves is the AAUP rule. The AALS rule adopts it by
reference,'16 with some emphasis on the 1970 committee report. 17 I
rather suspect that the AALS means to reject all exceptions to academic
freedom. Brigham Young's recent statement,18 setting forth in careful
terms the limitations it feels compelled to impose on academic freedom,
probably puts it in violation of the AALS rule.
B. The Relative Importance of Formal and Informal Obstacles
The formal accreditation rules are significant but secondary. I agree
with the speakers who have said that the principal obstacles to perpetu-
ating religious commitment and integrity are internal and informal. The
most obvious internal obstacle is the aspirations of the faculty. It is
tough to hire the second best person academically, even if that person is
very good. You pay a price for such hiring, and faculty rarely want to
pay that price. Faculty want respect in the larger secular academic
community.
This desire for respect makes the faculty responsive to the elite secu-
lar culture that Stephen Carter has written about.'9 It is sometimes em-
barrassing in an academic setting to be thought of as one of those people
who takes religion seriously.
These conflicting pressures mean that there will be disagreements
within the faculty about the relative balance of the religious mission and
the academic mission. That is inevitable. Disagreements will also arise
14. Report of Committee A 1988-89, 75 ACADEME at 49, 54 (Sept.-Oct. 1989).
15. Id.
16. Bylaws of the Ass'n of Am. Law Schools § 6-8(d) in AALS HANDBOOK, supra note
11.
17. Executive Com. Reg. § 6.16 in AssOcIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 1.
18. STATEMENT ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT BRIGHAM YOUNG UNmvERsrry, reprinted in
Douglas Laycock, The Rights of Religious Academic Communities, 20 J.C. & U.L. 15, app. at
34-42 (1993).
19. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CUrLTURE OF DISBELIEF (1993).
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within the faculty and the church about how best to understand the reli-
gious mission. There will be liberal and conservative views of what the
tradition requires will emerge. Different people acting in complete good
faith can emphasize all sorts of different strands within the tradition dif-
ferently. Some strands of the tradition will be far more comfortable than
others to the secularists in the faculty.
These cultural and intellectual pressures are far more powerful than
the pressure exerted by the accrediting rules. Even so, the accrediting
rules are important for several reasons. First, they are a symptom, a sign
of the seriousness of the larger problem. I think the recent conflicts over
accrediting have arisen because the secular agencies have been moving
in for the kill. The AAUP says that we no longer need an academic
freedom exception for religious institutions. We had to have it as a mat-
ter of political accommodation in 1915 and even in 1940, but in 1970 or
1988 we no longer needed it. When the ABA and the AALS tried to
take away the religious exception for sexual orientation discrimination,
the implicit claim was that we had reached a point of secularization such
that we did not have to keep accommodating those funny little schools
that retained religious objections. The gay community may be only a
small percentage of the population, but it may have more political clout
than religiously affiliated law schools.
Second, the accreditation rules can constrain your options for dealing
with the underlying problem of sustaining both academic excellence and
religious mission. That problem is very difficult, and you need all the
tools that you can think of at your disposal. The accreditation rules may
take away some of those tools.
Someone said yesterday that these rules and the fights over these
rules are mostly symbolic. The rules have not really constrained options
because there are so many other constraints, and because the rules have
not been enforced. The fights have arisen over the enactment or amend-
ment of the rules; no agency has actually withdrawn a school's accredita-
tion for having violated a rule on religious grounds. All that is true, but
if your school is unable to comply with a proposed rule, it is folly to defer
fighting until your accreditation is on the line.
If you acquiesce when the rule is proposed, then when you get a live
issue and you violate the rule, the accreditation authorities will tell you
that the question of a religious exemption has already been settled.
They will say they proposed a rule and they heard from only fifteen
schools, and even those did not oppose it vigorously. So the debate is
over. You lost. Now the only question is whether you are in compliance
[Vol. 78:297
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or in violation. So even if it seems symbolic when such a rule is pro-
posed, that is the point at which to fight it.
Third-and this may be their most important effect-the accredita-
tion rules provide arguments and leverage for the secularizers within the
faculty.20 They change the nature of the internal debate. We have heard
lots of references to conflicts that illustrate that internal debate. The
Land O'Lakes statement and the resistance to Exordia Ecclesia are two
examples of the tension between the Church hierarchy and its desire to
emphasize the religious mission, on the one hand, and the faculty and its
desire to tilt more towards the secular mission, on the other. The culture
wars are within each religious tradition and not merely between the reli-
gious and the secular.21 There are those who would change the faith,
and there are those who would secularize the institution.
Beyond a certain point, something like the law of entropy applies.
There is a point of no return at which a secularized institution will not go
back and become religious. At least, it will not do so if it depends on
faculty governance processes. Once the faculty is randomly distributed
with respect to religious belief, there is no force at work to re-sort facul-
ties and recreate a predominance of a particular faith. There are many
forces of secularization at work, but I see few forces that might reverse
the trend once the faculty has abandoned the religious mission. The
principal counterforce is that new religious schools begin. Some day
they may be great universities. But in the short run, they are small and
struggling and they are not direct replacements for the more distin-
guished religious universities that became secularized.
It is important to be clear about the nature of the loss when a reli-
gious school loses the religious part of the mission and becomes wholly
secular. It is a loss in religious terms, and it is a loss to the religious
community that created that school. But if it happens internally, it is not
a loss to religious liberty. It is simply a choice. An institution chose to
go another way, and the law should protect that choice. The accrediting
authorities should also protect that choice. Secularization is a loss to
religious liberty only when it is imposed from the outside, when the pres-
sures of the law or the accrediting authorities push an institution toward
or away from secularization.
20. I am indebted to Father Heft of the University of Dayton, who made this point in a
conversation at the conference. It was one of those points that made obvious sense as soon as
he said it.
21. See generally JAMES DAviSON HuNmR, CuL. RE WAs (1991).
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This distinction between internal debate and external pressure is too
often overlooked, even on the inside. It is especially overlooked from
the outside. The accrediting authorities are always telling one school
what they heard at some other school that seemed unconcerned about
an objectionable rule. But it is simply irrelevant that some other school
with the same denominational affiliation did not object. The AALS and
the ABA cannot tell religious institutions how to define their mission.
They cannot tell Catholic University or Villanova that Barbara Aldave is
doing it differently down at St. Mary's, or vice versa. And if Pope John
XXIII University is different from Pope Pius IX University, so be it.
They are different threads in the tradition. It does not matter that only
fifteen schools complained. If one school complained, and if that one
school has a religious objection, that school is entitled to adhere to its
version of the faith.22
That includes even the hard case of dismissals of tenured faculty on
matters that would otherwise be a violation of academic freedom. Most
of the schools represented in this room would never do it. Those who
would do it, would do it only in the most extreme cases. But it is an
internal decision. It is a decision to be debated among your faculties. It
is, in my view, none of the business of the ABA or the AALS.
III. RELIGION AS A SPECIAL AND NOT So SPECIAL CASE
Robert Destro objected yesterday to special treatment of religion.
He complained that special provisions about religion in the accrediting
rules suggest that religion is somehow suspect. Listeners objected that
he wanted exemptions from some of these rules, and they said that an
exemption is a special treatment. I think that response is right. Religion
is entitled to special treatment in some ways, but I also agree with what I
think Professor Destro was complaining about. Religion is unique in
some ways; in other ways, it presents issues with obvious secular analogs.
The question is not whether religion should get special treatment, but
rather when, and how, and to what extent.
What Professor Destro objects to in the special treatment of religion
in the current accrediting rules is not that some rules are only for reli-
gion, and certainly not that there is an exemption for some religious law
schools. What he objects to is the sense in the rules, more explicit in the
debate surrounding the rules, that the religious exemption is a threat,
that the religious institution is a threat, that religion is a dangerous force
22. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707,714-15 (1981)(protections individuals
bona fide religious belief even though it was not shared by other members of his church).
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that has to be controlled. It is not just that religious institutions have a
special liberty that entitles them to an exemption; it is also that religious
institutions are a special danger. They do things like inquisitions. It has
been four hundred years, but you never know, it might break out
again.23 The first step is letting them constrain the academic freedom of
their own faculty; next they will be burning people at the stake. There is
a lack of respect, a sense of condescension, that many speakers at this
conference have talked about. It appears in the accrediting rules, and
more generally in the elite secular culture.
This fear of religion contrasts sharply with how the secular academic
community treats other intellectual movements. We are expected in our
hiring and promotion decisions to take seriously all sorts of intellectual
perspectives, some of which I find very strange. Marxism is a movement
that seems to have outlived its time but is alive and well in the American
academy.24 Critical legal studies, post-modernism, deconstruction, at-
tacks on linear thinking - these are all thriving movements. Is the al-
ternative to linear thinking circular thinking, or disconnected thinking?
My favorite law library expended public funds to buy a book that
promises a "feminist-vegetarian critical theory."'  I am not making this
up; we are supposed to take that seriously. But many of our colleagues
would not take seriously a Catholic or a Calvinist or a Lutheran theory.
To the extent that is so, the academy is being inconsistent about one of
its core values. The academy's extraordinary intellectual pluralism does
not reach to religious perspectives.
Just as secular schools have their own intellectual movements that
look different from more traditional ones, so they have secular con-
straints on academic freedom. At the time this talk was given, I was
chairing the search committee for a new Executive Vice-President and
Provost at The University of Texas. The advertisement for this position,
in the Chronicle of Higher Education, listed the qualifications: A doc-
toral degree or equivalent, a distinguished record of teaching and re-
search, and a commitment to affirmative action.26 From the institutional
perspective, that made sense. We are a university that once was segre-
23. See William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTnNGs L.J. 843 (1993)
(using an extended analysis of Fyodor Dostevsky's fictional character the Grand Inquisitor to
illustrate why religion can be a dangerous force).
24. See Amanda Bennett, U.S. Marxists Thrive Despite Communism's Demise, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 6, 1994, at B1.
25. CAROL J. ADAMS, THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF MEAT. A FEINIST-VEGETARIAN CRTI-
CA. THEORY (1990).
26. CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUc, Nov. 17, 1993 at B58.
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gated; we are the law school of Sweatt v. Painter.27 There are reasons to
say that affirmative action is one of those values that is so important we
are going to impose it on everybody.
But it is equally clear that this is an enormous constraint on academic
freedom. There are many academics who have genuine doubts about the
proper limits of affirmative action, about the justice of imposing the cost
of remedying the past on young people rather than on those who were
older and around for more of the evil, about the risk that it may harm
race relations more than it helps. All of those people are told, in effect:
"Do not aspire to high positions of academic leadership here. We have a
test oath. There is just one thing that you have to believe, just one thing
that you must be committed to, just one thing on which dissent ends your
prospects for an administrative career." But I did not hear a single com-
plaint about that ad. No one came forward to say it was inappropriate.
Texas eventually promoted the Dean of the Law School to be Execu-
tive Vice President and Provost, and because no good deed goes unpun-
ished, I also chaired the search for a new Dean. The advertisement for
the Dean's position did not mention affirmative action, but that did not
make the issue go away. Two potential candidates have asked me
whether their views on affirmative action would bar them from serious
consideration. Indeed, this was the very first question each of them
asked. They know that they dissent from the orthodox position, and
they assume that there is a price. My answer was that they could believe
anything they wanted, and that they could have criticized affirmative ac-
tion in print at times in the past, but that they would have to promise not
to try to reopen the issue or change the faculty's consensus on the issue.
I have no doubt that was the right answer, but I could not help feeling
like the regulators who tell religious minorities that they can believe any-
thing they like as long as they do not try to act on it.
At the faculty level, there is no explicit test oath about affirmative
action; informal pressure to conform to the dominant view is strong on
some campuses and weak on others. I have colleagues who are opposed
to affirmative action; I have one who consulted with plaintiffs who sued
us to try to enjoin our affirmative action policy. But it is fairly clear
there is a de facto rule that we must preserve a predominance of the
faculty who are committed to affirmative action. That is not written
down anywhere in the way it is written down that Notre Dame must
preserve a predominance of Catholic faculty. But I have not the slight-
est doubt that departments which became overtly resistant to affirmative
27. 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (invalidating racial segregation in public law schools).
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action would discover that they had difficulties with the higher adminis-
tration. I suspect that discretionary budget allocations would start to
look bad. The point is not that Texas or other schools with similar poli-
cies have done something terribly inappropriate. The point is simply
that secular institutions also have core values that are sustained by con-
straints on academic freedom, and the AALS adds what coercive power
it has to the maintenance of those values.
The affirmative action debate parallels the debate over religious uni-
versities in another way as well. An issue at the heart of the affirmative
action debate is whether the proper unit of analysis is the individual,
racial, or sexual group. A recurring issue in the debate over academic
freedom and religious discrimination at religious universities is whether
the proper unit of analysis is the individual or the institution. These are
parallel questions; the religious institution is an embodiment of the reli-
gious group.
With respect to race, sex, and ethnicity, the accrediting authorities
unambiguously focus on the group. We must do justice to groups. Our
institutions must be representative of ethnic and sexual groups, and if
individuals must bear the cost, so be it. It is an inevitable consequence
of most of our affirmative action policies that some white applicants will
be rejected even though they are better qualified than some minority
students who are admitted, and that some white students who are admit-
ted will get less financial aid than some minority students who have
equal financial need or even less financial need. The focus is on manag-
ing diversity, on doing justice to the group, and on nondiscrimination at
the level of the group. That is controversial in the larger society, but
among academics, the balance of opinion has turned overwhelmingly in
favor of group justice.
With respect to religion, the focus of the accrediting authorities has
remained on the individual. The religious institution is permitted to pur-
sue its religious mission, but only as long as no cost is imposed on any
individual. The accrediting authorities believe that you cannot impose a
cost on a person who does not share your religious belief, even if the
only cost is that someone goes to a different law school.2 Their ap-
proach is similar with respect to hiring and discharge of faculty. You
cannot impose a cost on individual professors.29 You cannot require any
28. See, e.g., Oral Roberts Univ. v. American Bar Ass'n, No. 81-C3171 (N.D. Ill. July 22,
1981).
29. For an illustration of this view, see Judith J. Thomson & Matthew W. Finkin, Aca-
demic Freedom and Church-Related Higher Education: A Reply to Professor McConnell, in
FREEDoM AND TENuRE IN THE ACADEMy 419,423,425-26,429 (William W. Van Alstyne ed.,
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faculty member to sacrifice any fraction of his or her academic freedom
in order to help sustain the religious mission. Neither the rules, nor the
rhetoric of those who enforce the rules, reflects any sense of diversity at
the institutional level. There is no sense of the religious university as a
mediating institution that stands between the individual and the state,
preserving diversity and preserving liberty.
There is an inconsistency here. And it is not just a logical inconsis-
tency. It is not just that in some technical way the accrediting authorities
are looking at the group in one case and at the individual in another
case. They look at the group in cases where they are sympathetic to the
goals of the group. They look at the individual in cases where they are
not sympathetic to the goals of the group. The accrediting authorities
are sympathetic to the goals of racial minorities and women, and so they
encourage institutions to impose costs on individuals in pursuit of those
goals. They are generally unsympathetic to the religious mission of reli-
gious universities, so any cost to individuals seems excessive.
IV. CONCLUSION
One way in which religion plainly is special is that there are special
legal protections for religious choice. The Constitution and the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act30 guarantee the free exercise of religion.
The difficult choices about how to preserve academic and religious com-
mitments are to be made by religious academics and religious universi-
ties, not by government.
The ABA and AALS should simply back off and give the religious
schools space to pursue their own missions. Let them struggle with their
conflicting commitments. It is a difficult mission to perpetuate both aca-
demic excellence and religious commitment in the same institution over
a long period of time. Some will succeed, some will fail. In the long run
it may be that most will fail. If we had enough historical data I think we
could calculate the half life of serious religious commitment at religious
universities in the United States. But a lot of talented people are work-
ing to sustain those commitments, and some of them may last for a long
time.
James White said yesterday the ABA's focus is only on the soundness
of the education delivered. I wish I believed him, and I hope he comes
1993)(conceding the value of religious institutions of higher education, but denying that they
should "continue to exist at the cost of using coercion").
30. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000b to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V
1993).
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to believe it as well. Most of these schools meet minimum standards of
quality, and for those who do not, the focus should be on that problem
and not on some other problem. I would not let the ABA or the AALS
ask Carl Monk's question: "What values are so important that they have
to be imposed on all our members?" It is no business of the state to
impose values on religious institutions.31
The ABA is the state for this purpose, because in most states it oper-
ates with the delegated coercive authority of the state supreme court.
The AALS is not the state, as Professor Monk said. It is a membership
organization, and it is legally free to do whatever it wants. It can expel
all the religious law schools if it wants. But just try to imagine the con-
troversy that would ensue if the AALS said it was just a private organi-
zation and so it would adopt some racially discriminatory policy. I think
it would be inappropriate, although not illegal, for the AALS to try to
impose values on religious institutions.
What the AALS should do ethically and as a matter of sound policy,
is to back off and let the religious institutions pursue their dual mission.
For the religious institutions, I would emphasize the good sense, if not
the moral duty, of full and fair disclosure. This is not because religion is
especially dangerous or has to be constrained with a disclosure require-
ment, but because disclosure is both better for the mission and fairer to
those who will not value the mission. You do not want people in the
faculty meeting saying, "This wasn't even a Catholic school when I was
hired; what are you doing to me?" Someone at this conference said that
happened at their school, which means that somebody failed to disclose
the religious commitment when that person was hired. You will get a
larger number of malcontents and a larger number of people actively
working to subvert the religious mission if you are not candid about what
you are trying to accomplish. Affirmatively state that dual mission. If
your religious commitment includes limitations on academic freedom,
affirmatively state those limitations. The Brigham Young statement is
extraordinarily well done. I think the more disclosure the better, both
for your mission and for the secularists who do not want to share in it.
For any school that seriously pursues both academic and religious
commitments over the long term, the internal debate will be lively and
sustained. The important point is that the debate should be internal.
The ABA and AALS should stay out of the debate and let the religious
institutions conduct it.
31. Cf Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) (holding that "it is no part of the business
of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people").
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